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Abstract
This paper exposits a model of parallel trading of corporate securities (shares, bonds) and
derivatives in which a large trader can sometimes pro￿tably acquire securities with their cor-
porate control rights for the sole purpose of reducing the corporation￿ s value and gaining on a
net short position created through o⁄-setting derivatives. At other times, the large trader prof-
itably takes a net long position. The large trader requires no private information beyond its own
trades. The problem is most likely to manifest when derivatives trade on an exchange and trans-
actions give blocking powers to small minorities, particularly out-of-bankruptcy restructurings
and freezeouts. JEL: G34, K22.
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1 Introduction
Securities regulators, practitioners, and legal commentators worry that derivatives may provide
shareholders and creditors incentives to destroy value in their corporation.1 The basic concern is
that if shareholders or creditors own a su¢ cient amount of o⁄-setting derivatives such as put options
or credit default swaps (CDS), any losses on their shares or debt will be more than o⁄-set by the
corresponding gains on their derivatives ("over-hedging"). In this case, shareholders and creditors
bene￿t by using the control rights inherent in their shares or debt to reduce the corporation￿ s value
("negative voting"). An important question that is generally not considered, however, is whether
it would ever be pro￿table for shareholders or creditors to acquire so many derivatives in the ￿rst
place. After all, any gains to shareholders and creditors come at the expense of their counterparties
on their derivative contracts. These counterparties would therefore prefer not to sell the derivatives,
or only at a price that compensates them for the future payouts, thus depriving shareholders and
creditors of any pro￿t in the overall scheme.
This paper argues that over-hedging and negative voting can indeed be pro￿table with a mini-
mal and realistic degree of investor heterogeneity and asymmetric information. The paper presents
a model of parallel trading of corporate securities (shares, bonds) and derivatives in which a large,
strategic trader interacts with liquidity traders and competitive market makers. The key assump-
tions are that market makers cannot observe the large trader￿ s orders directly, and cannot infer
them from aggregate order ￿ ow because of ￿ uctuating liquidity trades. In this case, market makers
cannot predict how control rights will be exercised if the large trader only over-hedges some of the
time. Prices will re￿ ect some probability of negative voting, allowing the large trader to bene￿t
from its private information about its own trades and expected vote. In e⁄ect, the large trader
is exploiting private information about payo⁄ uncertainty that the large trader itself creates. The
large trader bene￿ts at the expense of liquidity traders, whose trades provide camou￿ age to the
1Regulators: See, e.g., Securities and Exchange Commission, Concept Release on the U.S. Proxy System, 75
Fed. Reg. 42,982, 43,017-20 (July 22, 2010); Committe of European Securities Regulators, Public Statement of the
Market Participants Consultative Panel CESR/10/567 (July 5, 2010), at 3-4. Practitioners: See, e.g., Soros (2010)
and Sender (2009) (quoting from David Einhorn￿ s letter to investors). Commentators: See in particular Martin and
Partnoy (2005) and Hu and Black (2007, 2008).
2large trader.
The assumption that counterparties cannot observe the large trader￿ s positions and hence its
incentives for exercising control rights seems to capture many situations in real world derivative
markets. This is obvious to the extent derivatives are traded on an exchange and centrally cleared.
Such anonymous trading has long been the standard for equity options and is now generally man-
dated by the Dodd-Frank Act. But even when trading occurs over-the-counter (OTC), traders￿
positions and strategies are con￿dential and remain largely hidden from their counterparties (e.g.,
Avellaneda and Cont 2010 for the CDS market). To be sure, any market participant in an OTC
market knows the identity of it direct counterparty, at least post-trade. But since dealers routinely
enter into chains of hedging transactions (e.g., Stulz 2010), the ultimate buyer of protection will
usually be unaware of the identity of the ultimate seller, and vice versa.2 In addition, investors can
conceal their overall position even from their direct counterparties by splitting trades among many
of them.
The foregoing assumption distinguishes the present paper from Bolton and Oehmke (2011) and
Campello and Matta (2012). These very insightful papers analyze the e⁄ect of CDS availability on
renegotiation in an incomplete contracting model of debt with strategic default. In their model,
creditors￿ability to hedge their exposure to the debtor with CDS contracts increases creditors￿
bargaining power in renegotiation. This reduces the incidence of strategic default and therefore
has the bene￿cial e⁄ect of increasing the debt capacity of the ￿rm; at the same time, overinsurance
may lead to an ine¢ ciently high frequency of bankruptcy. Crucially, these papers assume that
the CDS protection sellers observe the exact position of the buyer-creditor, who therefore never
gains from dealing in CDS as such. While this assumption is justi￿ed in many situations, the
asymmetric information scenario considered in the present paper seems better suited to other
situations, particularly for exchange trading of derivatives. In e⁄ect, a parallel reading of the
aforementioned papers and the present one demonstrates the crucial importance of CDS market
structure for discussing the costs and bene￿ts of these derivatives.
Brav and Mathews (2011) present a model closely related to the present one in the context
of equity trading with record date capture.3 Like the present paper, Brav and Mathews build
2Chen et al. (2011) report that dealers often do not hedge large trades right away but only in the course of several
days. Unless default of the reference entity is imminent, however, this does not change the basic point here.
3Also see parallel work by Zachariadis and Olaru (2012), who also build on Kyle and Vila (1991) but consider only
3on the idea and basic model of Kyle (1984) and Kyle and Vila (1991): camou￿ aged by noise
traders, a strategic trader can earn a trading pro￿t if that trader has the power to in￿ uence the
corporation￿ s value upwards (downwards) only when going long (short). As Kyle and Vila note, it
is not crucial that the large trader￿ s in￿ uence (in Kyle and Vila, a takeover) improves the value of
the corporation relative to the baseline of no large trader: any power to in￿ uence the value of the
corporation produces opportunities for trading pro￿ts. Of course, the coupling of control rights to
cash ￿ ow rights usually ensures that such power will only be exercised by those who would improve
the ￿rm value relative to the baseline. Brav and Mathews decouple control and cash ￿ ow rights,
however, by allowing the large trader to sell shares, including short sales, between the record date
(which determines voting rights) and the vote date, as is true in practice. Similarly, the present
paper decouples cash ￿ ow rights and control rights through trading in derivatives. The papers
then develop di⁄erent aspects of the model. Brav and Mathews emphasize the trade-o⁄ between
giving more weight to an informed trader￿ s voice and the danger of value-destroying behavior. By
contrast, the present paper focuses on the economic mechanism (section 2) and the institutional
conditions (section 4) that allow pro￿table value-destroying behavior in the ￿rst place, highlighting
the role of the trading environment (information and liquidity).
Empirical work on negative voting has been severely limited by the lack of investor-level position
and voting data. Papers that have looked at correlations between the availability of CDS and
corporate bankruptcy have found mixed results, depending on the time period studied and the
construction of the sample (Peristiani and Savino 2011; Bedendo et al. 2012). In the future,
regulators may gain access to the requisite data for more probative empirical studies. In the
meantime, gaining a ￿rm theoretical understanding of the question remains of pressing importance.
2 The Economic Mechanism
To facilitate understanding of the formal model presented in the next section, this section will lead
with a verbal description of the main economic mechanism at work.
Imagine that two assets trade in a market with three types of participants. The traded assets
binary trading choices (i.e., trade or no trade) and add another strategic player, namely the ￿rm manager who makes
a take-it-or-leave-it restructuring o⁄er. With these assumptions, they ￿nd that value-destroying behavior occurs only
if the hedge fund has a pre-existing position in the ￿rm￿ s debt, or debt and equity markets do not incorporate the
same information.
4are bonds (publicly traded debt claims) and credit insurance on those bonds. The market partic-
ipants are a hedge fund, numerous benign traders such as pension funds and mutual funds, and
numerous competitive ￿nancial institutions that act as market makers. The benign traders buy and
sell random quantities regardless of price for exogenous purposes such as ful￿lling redemptions or
purchases, portfolio rebalancing, or compliance with fund risk policies. Competition between mar-
ket makers ensures that the benign traders always obtain prices equal to the value that is expected
given publicly available information. The precise structure of trading will be discussed later.
After trading, the value of the bonds ￿and hence the payouts on credit insurance contracts ￿
will be determined by a bondholder vote on a proposed restructuring. For illustrative purposes,
assume that the bonds will be worthless if creditors reject the restructuring, but pay the full face
amount if creditors accept the restructuring. Conversely, credit insurance will pay out nothing if
the restructuring succeeds, and will pay the full insured amount if the restructuring fails. Naturally,
bondholders will accept the restructuring unless they own more than full credit insurance on their
bonds, i.e., unless they are over-hedged.
To keep things simple, assume that only one market participant ￿the hedge fund ￿is ruthless
enough to consider over-hedging and negative voting. That is, only the hedge fund would purchase
more credit insurance than bonds and attempt to block the restructuring. One can imagine that
reputational or regulatory concerns prevent other market participants from considering this strat-
egy. The probability that the hedge fund would be able to block the restructuring is increasing in
the number of bonds that the hedge fund owns. The willingness of the hedge fund to block the
restructuring depends only on the hedge fund￿ s relative holdings of bonds and credit insurance: if
the hedge fund owns more credit insurance, the hedge fund will attempt to block the restructuring;
otherwise, it will not.
These assumptions imply that the expected value of the bonds ￿and the expected payouts on
the credit insurance ￿depends entirely on how many bonds and how much credit insurance the
hedge fund ends up owning. The problem for market makers is that they do not know the hedge
fund￿ s trades and ultimate position, and hence cannot determine exactly how much the bonds or
credit insurance will be worth. The crucial but realistic assumption is that market makers cannot
observe the hedge fund￿ s trades. In particular, the hedge fund can conceal its trades by placing
orders through di⁄erent brokers. Market makers are able to observe aggregate market turnover ￿
5through information repositories, or exchange data ￿ , but these aggregate numbers compound the
hedge fund￿ s trades with the random trades of benign traders.
The best that market makers will be able to do is to form expectations of the hedge fund￿ s
positions based on the aggregate trading data. Before discussing this inference problem, however,
it is instructive to consider what would happen if market makers￿expectations did not depend
on trading volume. Consider two extreme cases. If market makers believed that the hedge fund
will block the restructuring, the bond price would be zero (recall that competition between market
makers will push prices to expected value), while credit insurance would cost exactly the insured
amount. In this case, the hedge fund could make (unlimited) pro￿ts by buying (all the) bonds for
free, selling (unlimited amounts of) insurance, and not preventing the restructuring. At the other
extreme, if market makers believed that the hedge fund will not block the restructuring, the bond
price would be equal to its face amount, while credit insurance would be costless. In this case, the
hedge fund could make unlimited pro￿ts by buying unlimited amounts of credit insurance for free
and just enough bonds to block the restructuring.
To analyze how market makers are going to form beliefs about the hedge fund￿ s positions from
aggregate market data, it is necessary to specify the trading process in more detail. The model
considers the simplest possible market with only one round of trading. First, the hedge fund and
liquidity traders submit their orders (buys and sells). Second, market makers observe aggregate
orders. Third, market makers ￿ll all these orders at competitive prices, i.e., prices that correspond
to their best estimate of the probability that the hedge fund will block the restructuring.
In this setup, market makers beliefs about the hedge fund￿ s position will be based on their
observation of aggregate orders in combination with their prior beliefs about the distribution of
benign traders￿orders. In particular, when the demand for bonds or derivatives is extremely high
or low (this includes negative demand), market makers will assume with high probability that this
demand emanates mostly from the hedge fund if and because benign traders never submit such
large orders. For more moderate values, market makers will not know if they result from relatively
high demand by the hedge fund and relatively low demand by the benign market participants, or
vice versa. In this case, market makers must assign probability estimates based on the relative
likelihood of these two scenarios, and prices will re￿ ect weighted average values.
These average prices enable the hedge fund to pro￿t from mixing both strategies. Sometimes
6the hedge fund pro￿ts by over-hedging and blocking the restructuring. At other times, the hedge
fund gains by not over-hedging and letting the restructuring proceed because it can buy the bond
at a price discount, and sell credit insurance at a price premium, that re￿ ect the possibility of the
restructuring being blocked. To be sure, the hedge fund cannot predict benign traders demand. If
high (low) demand by the hedge fund coincides with high (low) demand by benign traders, market
makers can infer the hedge fund￿ s positions and hence accurately predict bond and insurance payo⁄s.
In this case, the hedge fund does not make any pro￿ts. When high hedge fund demand coincides
with low demand by benign traders and vice versa, however, the hedge fund makes a trading pro￿t.
In e⁄ect, the hedge fund is trading on private information on its own value-relevant strategy.
Where do the hedge fund￿ s pro￿ts come from? Competitive market makers always trade for
prices that are equal to expected value, given their information. Consequently, market makers
make zero pro￿ts or losses. The hedge fund￿ s pro￿ts come out of the pockets of the benign traders.
They tend to sell many derivative contracts when pay-outs on the contracts will turn out to be
high relative to the contracts￿price, and they tend to buy many contracts when pay-outs will turn
out to be low relative to the contracts￿price.
As a ￿nal note, the size of the hedge fund￿ s positions depends on trading costs such as com-
missions, bid-ask spreads, or margin requirements, and the variability of benign traders￿demand.
The higher the variability of benign traders￿demand, the bigger the stakes that the hedge fund
can hope to buy without being discovered, and hence the larger the trading pro￿ts that the hedge
fund can make. The higher the trading costs, the more conservatively the hedge fund will trade.
In the extreme, trading costs can be so high as to make it impossible for the hedge fund to make
any pro￿ts. In this sense, a more ￿liquid￿market facilitates over-hedging and negative voting.
3 The Formal Model
3.1 Model Setup
This subsection introduces the setup of the model: the two types of traded assets (securities and
derivatives), the three types of market participants (hedge fund, liquidity traders, and market
makers), and trading including information. It concludes with some remarks on this setup.
73.1.1 Timeline
The timeline of actions is as follows (details to follow in subsequent subsections):
1. The hedge fund and liquidity traders submit their orders.
2. The market makers observe only net market demand, which combines the hedge fund￿ s and
the liquidity traders￿orders. Based on this observation, market makers update their beliefs
about the expected value of the securities and derivatives. At these values (prices), they ￿ll
all net orders.
3. Security holders choose between two actions by some voting mechanism.
4. Payo⁄s are realized.
3.1.2 Traded assets
There are two traded4 assets with perfectly negatively correlated payo⁄s: securities, which will
throughout be denoted by the letter X, and derivatives, which will throughout be denoted by the
letter Y . If the security pays v, the derivative pays 1 ￿ v. Consequently, the derivative can be
interpreted as an insurance claim on the security. In particular, if the security were a bond, the
derivative could be a credit default swap; if the security were a share, the derivative could be a
total equity return swap.
The number of securities is normalized to one (of which in￿nitesimal divisions are traded). The
derivative is a synthetic asset; hence its net supply is zero but unlimited amounts can be sold and
bought. Short-selling is allowed for both derivatives and securities.
The security payo⁄ v depends on a binary choice between two actions, which is determined by
a vote of the security holders. For example, if the security is a bond, the choice could be whether
or not to agree to a proposed restructuring; if the security is a share, it could be whether or not to
agree to a merger. Normalize the payo⁄ when the "right" decision is taken to v = 1, and when the
"wrong" decision is taken to v = 0.
Each security provides one vote; derivatives do not provide any votes.
4"Trading" does not need to be understood literally in this model. In particular, it is possible that the derivative
is a contract that is sold over the counter. What matters is that there be an active market for the contract in which
various parties can act as sellers or buyers, which is true for many derivative markets.
8Naturally, a rational, informed, and unhedged security holder would always vote for the "right"
decision in order to receive v = 1. As will be discussed in the next subsection and the concluding
remarks on the model setup, this is indeed what all security holders are assumed to do. The one
exception is the hedge fund if and because the hedge fund owns more derivatives than securities, i.e.,
if the hedge fund owns securities but is over-hedged. The hedge fund￿ s ability to block the "right"
decision depends on whether the hedge fund￿ s security-holding is above some voting threshold. The
voting threshold is assumed to be a random variable distributed on [0;1] according to the continuous
cdf F (￿) with F (0) = 0 and F (1) = 1. The randomness captures unexpected variation in voter
participation, uncertainty arising from legal concerns, di⁄erent formal thresholds for di⁄erent types
of decisions, etc. The voting threshold is assumed to be independent of other exogenous variables
in the model, and it will be independent of any trading activity since it will be only revealed after
all trading occurs. Let x ￿ maxfxjF (x) = 0g ￿ 0.
3.1.3 Market Participants
There are three types of risk-neutral market participants: liquidity traders, one hedge fund, and
competitive market makers.
Liquidity traders The liquidity traders do not act strategically. They exogenously trade quan-
tities ~ x and ~ y of securities and derivatives, respectively, where positive numbers indicate that the
liquidity traders are buying, and negative numbers indicate that they are selling. These trades are
not sensitive to price, and the source of these trades is not modelled. To motivate these trades
and their price insensitivity, one may think of large institutional investors and their regulatory
constraints. For example, certain pension funds might be forced to sell bonds following a credit
downgrade of the borrower. Similarly, ￿nancial institutions might be forced to purchase credit
default swaps on certain bonds they hold. Or one may think of mutual funds having to liquidate
part of their portfolio to meet redemption requests.
Liquidity traders￿demand for derivatives, ~ y, is stochastic (keeping in mind that the "demand"
can be negative). With probability (1 ￿ ￿), the demand is low (~ y = y), while with probability ￿,
demand is high (~ y = ￿ y). De￿ne the di⁄erence between these demand realizations as ￿ ￿ ￿ y ￿y > 0.
For simplicity, liquidity traders￿demand for securities, ~ x, is assumed to be constant.
9Hedge fund The hedge fund does act strategically. Initially, the hedge fund does not hold any
securities or derivatives. It purchases quantities x and y of securities and derivatives, respectively,
taking into account the e⁄ect of its trades on the price (as explained below), its own voting power,
and its own voting incentives. As explained in the previous subsection, holding x > x securities
gives the hedge fund the voting power to implement the "wrong" decision with probability F (x) > 0
. Of course, the hedge fund will only have an incentive to use this power if y ￿ x. The hedge fund
incurs a ￿nancing cost C (x;y) with C (0;0) = minx;y C (x;y) = 0, sign[C1 (x;￿)] = sign(x) and
sign[C2 (￿;y)] = sign(y).
Market makers The market makers absorb any excess demand (^ x; ^ y) ￿ (~ x + x; ~ y + y). Since
they are risk-neutral, in￿nitesimally small, and in perfect competition with one another, they
purchase or sell these quantities at prices that equal expected value, as explained in more detail
below. Market makers have rational expectations, i.e. they update their beliefs about (x;y) upon
observing the net demand of securities (^ x; ^ y).
3.1.4 Remarks on the model setup
As noted in the introduction, the model builds on Kyle (1984) and Kyle and Vila (1991). Following
Brav and Mathews (2011), however, the model dispenses with the simplifying assumption in Kyle
(1984) and Kyle and Vila (1991) that the hedge fund has private information about noise trades.
That is, the model does not contain any exogenous asymmetric information; the only asymmetric
information pertains to the hedge fund￿ s own strategy. Also as in Brav and Mathews (2011),
the paper explicitly models as voting rights the source of the hedge fund￿ s power to in￿ uence
the corporation￿ s value, which remained a black box in Kyle and Vila (1991). While Brav and
Mathews (2011) break the link between voting and cash ￿ ow rights through trading between record
and voting date, the present paper does so with a second traded asset, the derivative. The addition
of trading costs is novel.
The model assumes that the hedge fund is able to acquire any amount x of securities that it
desires. In particular, this ability does not depend on the amount ~ x supplied by liquidity traders.
In reality, it may often be di¢ cult or impossible to acquire large blocks of shares or bonds. There
are, however, many situations in which exogenous sales of securities ~ x are large, and the reader may
10restrict the applicability of the model to such situations. For example, many institutional investors
sell all their holdings of a bond if the bond￿ s credit rating drops below investment grade (Da and
Gao 2009). Moreover, in the model, an upper bound on the amount x of securities that the hedge
fund can acquire would not change the hedge fund￿ s strategy, and the only change from the results
presented below would be that the hedge fund might have to settle for the upper bound rather
than its preferred, higher position (i.e., one would observe corner solutions).
Relatedly, the assumption that large purchases have no price impact beyond the probability
update by the market makers is not literally true. To go back to the acquisition of securities, it would
presumably become harder and harder to ￿nd additional securities as the hedge fund￿ s position
grows, and this would be re￿ ected in higher trading costs for larger positions. Mathematically,
however, the assumption of a ￿nancing cost for the hedge fund has the same e⁄ect as assuming
increasing trading costs for larger blocks, so that nothing substantive hinges on the assumption of
constant prices conditional on the updated probability.
Finally, it is a strong assumption that only the one hedge fund is ready to buy large stakes, and
to consider over-hedging its securities position and to vote the securities for the "wrong" decision.
This excludes, ￿rst, that any of the other market participants in the model, namely individual
market makers and liquidity traders, who must hold the remaining supply of securities, would ever
hold more derivatives than securities, or if they did, that they nevertheless voted for the "right"
decision. One justi￿cation for this could be institutional, namely that reputational concerns or
sheer apathy prevent market makers and liquidity traders to vote for the "wrong" decision, or to
over-hedge their securities position in the ￿rst place. One can also view the model as an illustration
of how "negative voting" can interfere with the smooth operation of a liquid, perfect market for
securities; in this view, the true equilibrium would be more complicated, and the model merely
illustrates why the market cannot be perfect.
Second, the above assumptions rule out strategic competition with a second large player. For
example, one can imagine a second hedge fund trying to share the spoils, or to buy up enough
of the security at a low price to prevent the ￿rst hedge fund from ever winning a vote for the
"wrong" decision. From a practical point of view, however, adding another strategic player would
complicate the model but not eliminate the underlying economic problem. For example, even if the
security were trading at deep discount because of the hedge fund￿ s presence, another large player
11could not necessarily pro￿tably intervene by buying up the entire supply of securities if and because
that second large player incurs similar ￿nancing cost as the ￿rst hedge fund. Moreover, even if the
second large player could pro￿tably do this, then in expectation the price of the security would
re-adjust to 1, so that the strategy would end up being not pro￿table after all. Subsection 3.5
below states this argument formally.
3.2 Equilibrium Concept
In principle, the equilibrium concept employed here is Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium, including
in particular subgame perfection and rational, Bayesian expectations. The above assumptions on
individual behavior, however, allow summarizing the strategic interaction in two simple equilibrium
conditions that greatly facilitate discussion of the results (cf. Kyle 1984, 1985; Kyle and Vila 1991).
The assumption that liquidity traders￿trades are exogenous means that liquidity traders decisions
need not be explicitly considered at all.
First, the assumption that market-makers act as competitive, risk-neutral price takers and
absorb any net demand (^ x; ^ y) means that their behavior can be summarized by the price function.
The price function is in turn pinned down by market-makers￿ rational expectations about the
security￿ s payo⁄:
E¢ cient markets: for some ￿(￿;￿), Py (^ x; ^ y) = 1 ￿ Px (^ x; ^ y) = ￿(^ x; ^ y) 2 [0;1]; (1)
where Px (^ x; ^ y) is the price of securities, Py (^ x; ^ y) is the price of derivatives, and ￿(^ x; ^ y) : R2 ! [0;1]
is a probability belief compliant with Bayes￿rule that the security will pay zero, all conditional on
observed net demand of securities and derivatives, (^ x; ^ y). Some elements of this e¢ cient markets
condition would not require rational expectations: The absence of arbitrage alone would imply
that derivative and security prices lie between zero and one and sum to one because the two assets
are perfectly negatively correlated, together always pay one, and individually never pay less than
zero or more than one. The requirement that ￿(￿;￿) comply with Bayes￿rule, however, imposes
important additional constraints that will be discussed in subsection 3.3 below.
Second, the hedge fund only has two meaningful choice variables, namely its trades x and y.
12That is, the hedge fund￿ s equilibrium strategy is captured by
Pro￿t maximization: ￿
￿
x0;y0￿
> 0 )
￿
x0;y0￿
2 argmax
(x;y)
E~ y [￿(x;y;￿(x + ~ x;y + ~ y))], (2)
where ￿(x;y;￿) is the hedge fund￿ s pro￿t given its choice of trades (x;y) and ￿, and ￿ (x;y) 2
[0;1] is the probability with which the hedge fund chooses trades (x;y). The hedge fund￿ s choice
of ￿ (x;y) will of course take into account the e⁄ect of its trades on prices, i.e., on the probability
inference of the market makers, ￿(^ x; ^ y). In that sense, the e¢ cient market condition implies an
inverse demand curve against which the hedge fund maximizes.
In principle, the hedge fund also needs to choose its vote at the voting stage. This choice,
however, is trivially determined by its holdings of securities and derivatives. If the hedge fund
holds more securities than derivatives (x > y), it will vote for the "right" decision. In the opposite
case (x < y), it will vote for the "wrong" decision. To be sure, mixing is possible if x = y, but this
will never occur unless x = y = 0 because given trading cost, it would not be pro￿table for the
hedge fund (see proof of Lemma 1).
3.3 Equilibrium in the General Case
The equilibrium of the model depends principally on the hedge fund￿ s trading cost function. If the
costs are large, they outweigh any trading gains, such that abstention (x = y = 0) is the hedge
fund￿ s only viable strategy. On the other hand, if the hedge fund￿ s costs are low, it always pays
for the hedge fund to try its luck ￿to the extent noise trades camou￿ age the hedge fund￿ s trade,
market makers cannot be sure about whether the hedge fund is long or short and must choose some
intermediate price, at which the hedge fund can turn a trading pro￿t. Proposition 1 below states
this formally; Lemma 1 prepares the ground by setting forth the equilibrium inference function.
Lemma 1 One inference function sustaining all possible equilibria is
￿eq (^ x; ^ y) ￿
8
> > > > <
> > > > :
0 if ^ x ￿ ~ x ￿ x or ^ y ￿ y < ^ x ￿ ~ x
F (^ x ￿ ~ x) if x < ^ x ￿ ~ x < ^ y ￿ ￿ y
maxf0;minfF (^ x ￿ ~ x);￿￿ (^ x; ^ y)gg otherwise
; (3)
13where ￿￿ (^ x; ^ y) ￿
F(^ x￿~ x)(1￿￿)[(^ y￿y)￿(^ x￿~ x)]+C(^ x￿~ x;^ y￿￿ y)￿C(^ x￿~ x;^ y￿y)
￿[(^ x￿~ x)￿(^ y￿￿ y)]+(1￿￿)[(^ y￿y)￿(^ x￿~ x)] .
Proof. See the appendix.
Brie￿ y, the reasoning behind ￿eq is as follows. First, some market demand realizations (^ x; ^ y)
fully reveal the hedge fund￿ s incentives, such that ￿ must be equal to 0 or F (^ x ￿ ~ x), as the case may
be (the hedge fund￿ s voting power can always be inferred from market demand because liquidity
traders￿demand for securities ~ x is non-stochastic). Second, at other market demand realizations,
de￿ning ￿eq to equate expected hedge fund pro￿ts from the long and short trades that could generate
this (^ x; ^ y) sustains mixing if these are equilibrium trades, and optimally deters deviations if these
are o⁄-equilibrium trades.
Proposition 1 The hedge fund￿ s equilibrium (expected) pro￿ts are maxf0;￿￿g, where
￿￿ ￿ max
! ￿ (x;y); (4)
! ￿ f(x;y)jx > x; y 2 [x ￿ ￿;x]g; (5)
￿ (x;y) ￿
F (x)￿(1 ￿ ￿)(x ￿ y)(y + ￿ ￿ x)
￿(x ￿ y) + (1 ￿ ￿)(y + ￿ ￿ x)
(6)
￿
￿(x ￿ y)C (x;y + ￿) + (1 ￿ ￿)(y + ￿ ￿ x)C (x;y)
￿(x ￿ y) + (1 ￿ ￿)(y + ￿ ￿ x)
:
The hedge fund￿ s equilibrium strategies depend on ￿￿:
(a) If ￿￿ < 0, the unique equilibrium is for the hedge fund not to trade at all (x = y = 0).
(b) If ￿￿ > 0, any strategy such that
P
(x￿;y￿)2argmax! ￿(x;y) [￿ (x￿;y￿) + ￿ (x￿;y￿ + ￿)] = 1 and
￿ (x￿;y￿) > 0 )
￿(x￿;y￿)
￿(x￿;y￿+￿) = 1￿￿
￿
h
F(x￿)
￿￿(x￿+~ x;y￿+￿ y) ￿ 1
i
8(x￿;y￿) 2 ! is an equilibrium; the equilib-
rium is unique if and only if argmax! ￿ (x;y) is unique.
(c) If ￿￿ = 0, any linear combination of (a) with strategy pro￿le (b) is an equilibrium.
Proof. By construction, ￿￿ coincides with the highest non-negative expected pro￿t, if any, that the
hedge fund can obtain from trades (x;y) 2 ! given ￿eq, since ￿ (x;y) =
￿(x ￿ y)￿￿ (x + ~ x;y + ￿ y) ￿ C (x;y) coincides with E~ y [￿(x;y;￿eq (￿;￿))j(x;y) 2 !] unless ￿eq is
truncated, which only occurs where expected pro￿ts are negative (see part (2)(b) of the proof of
Lemma 1). The maximum ￿￿ exists because ￿ is a continuous function on the closed interval
!. Any trade (x￿;y￿) generating ￿￿ ￿ and the trade (x￿;y￿ + ￿), which yields identical prof-
its by construction of ￿￿ ￿ will (strictly) dominate not trading (x = y = 0) if ￿￿ is (strictly)
14greater than zero; otherwise not trading strictly dominates. If more than one trade generates ￿￿,
the hedge fund is indi⁄erent between them and can mix them in any proportion. Mixing opti-
mal trade pairs ((x￿;y￿);(x￿;y￿ + ￿)) in the stated proportions ensures that ￿eq (x￿ + ~ x;y￿ + ￿ y) =
￿eq
￿
x￿ + ~ x;y￿ + ￿ + y
￿
=
F(x￿)(1￿￿)￿(x￿;y￿+￿)
(1￿￿)￿(x￿;y￿+￿)+￿￿(x￿;y￿) = Pr(v = 0j^ x; ^ y) is correct. If the hedge fund
does not trade, the inference ￿eq
￿
~ x;y
￿
= ￿eq (~ x; ￿ y) = 0 is correct because the hedge fund will not be
able to in￿uence the decision, so Pr(v = 1j^ x; ^ y) = 1.
It remains to be shown that only trades (x;y) 2 ! need to be considered in the search for a
pro￿table trade. Given the inference function ￿eq, the hedge fund￿ s trading pro￿ts are zero regardless
of the noise realization unless x ￿ ￿ ￿ y ￿ x + ￿ and x > x, and thus expected pro￿ts for such
trades are negative given positive trading costs.5 Moreover, by construction (see proof of Lemma
1), ￿eq ensures that for each trade (x;y) such that x < x ￿ y ￿ x+￿, there is a corresponding trade
(x;y ￿ ￿) 2 ! that yields equal expected pro￿ts unless expected pro￿ts for both trades are negative.
Corollary 1 There always exists a non-zero cost function C (￿;￿) such that a mixed equilibrium
exists.
Proof. If C (x;y) = 0 8(x;y), then ￿￿ = max!
F(x)￿(1￿￿)(x￿y)(y+￿￿x)
￿(x￿y)+(1￿￿)(y+￿￿x) > 0. The proof then follows
by continuity of ￿ (￿;￿;C (￿;￿)) in C (￿;￿).
3.4 Equilibrium with quadratic cost, uniform voting threshold distribution, and
symmetric liquidity trades
To gain further insight into the properties of the model￿ s equilibrium, this subsection analyzes the
special case
C (x;y) =
c
2
￿
x2 + y2￿
; (7)
F (x) = maxf0;minfx;1gg; (8)
￿ =
1
2
; (9)
5Regardless of the noise realization, trading pro￿ts are (x ￿ y)￿(x + ~ x;y + ~ y) = (x ￿ y) ￿ 0 = 0 if y < x ￿ ￿,
(y ￿ x)[F (x) ￿ ￿ (x + ~ x;y + ~ y)] = (y ￿ x)[F (x) ￿ F (x)] = 0 if y > x + ￿, and (x ￿ y) ￿ 0 = (y ￿ x)(0 ￿ 0) = 0 if
x ￿ x.
15where c > 0. Using Proposition 1, it is easy to verify that the hedge fund￿ s optimal securities
trade in this case is
x￿ =
￿
16c
(10)
together with either of
y￿
1 = x￿ ￿
￿
2
; or (11)
y￿
2 = x￿ +
￿
2
; (12)
provided that 0 < ￿ ￿ 16c ￿ 2
p
2 (for larger c, expected pro￿ts from trading would be negative,
so abstention would be optimal; for larger ￿ ￿ 1+
p
1￿32c2
2c , the corner solution x￿ = 1 and y￿
1;2 = 1￿ ￿
2
entails).
Not surprisingly then, the hedge fund becomes more aggressive (x￿ increases) as the market
becomes noisier and hence provides more camou￿ age (￿ increases), and as the costs of trading
decrease (c decreases). This translates into a higher unconditional probability that the "wrong"
decision will be adopted. With symmetric noise (￿ = 1￿￿ = 1
2) and a unique trading equilibrium,
this probability is
Pr(v = 0) = F (x￿)￿ (x￿;y￿
2) (13)
=
F (x￿)(1 ￿ ￿)￿ (x￿;y￿
2)
(1 ￿ ￿)￿ (x￿;y￿
2) + ￿￿ (x￿;y￿
1)
= ￿eq
￿
x￿ + ~ x;y￿
2 + y
￿
=
￿
16c
￿
1
2
￿ 2c
￿
:
This is increasing in the amount of "noise" or demand ￿ uctuation, ￿, and decreasing in the
trading cost or market illiquidity, c. The liquidity traders￿trading losses ￿2
128c (1 ￿ 4c) are also
increasing in the amount of "noise" or demand ￿ uctuation, ￿, and decreasing in the trading cost or
market illiquidity, c.
At least in this special case, the model therefore shows that increasing liquidity (c) and market
size (￿) aggravate the problem analyzed in this paper.
163.5 Multiple Hedge Funds
Explicitly modelling the interaction of multiple hedge funds is far from straightforward, and will
not be attempted here. As hinted above in subsection 3.1.4, however, one can at least state that
problems of negative voting would persist in the presence of multiple strategic traders:
Corollary 2 Regardless of the number of hedge funds, the equilibrium x = y = 0 exists if and only
if ￿￿ < 0.
Proof. If ￿￿ ￿ 0 and market makers￿ inference function is ￿eq, no individual hedge fund can
pro￿tably deviate by trading, while market makers correctly infer that the possibility of the "wrong"
decision being adopted is zero. Conversely, if ￿￿ > 0, then any one hedge fund would be better o⁄
trading regardless of the inference function (recall that ￿eq minimizes the maximum possible trading
pro￿t), so x = y = 0 cannot be an equilibrium. The presence of other non-trading hedge funds is
irrelevant to this argument.
4 Discussion
This section considers economic and legal constraints that curtail over-hedging and negative voting.
In particular, the section explains why the problem is much more likely to arise with derivatives than
with alternative, more traditional hedges, what "natural" and regulatory barriers currently limit
the problem, and in which situations the problem is therefore most likely to manifest. It argues that
the problem is likely to be most acute in out-of-bankruptcy restructurings and freezeouts, which
can be blocked by a relatively small minority stake, and arguably legally so.
4.1 Derivatives vs. other hedges
The ￿rst question to ask is why over-hedging is speci￿cally a problem of derivatives. In principle,
over-hedging can occur with any investment that is negatively related to the shares or debt at issue.
Some examples include parallel investments in competing ￿rms, parallel investments in both the
acquiror and the target of a merger transaction, parallel investments in di⁄erent securities of the
same ￿rm, or selling short some amount of a security while holding on to a smaller amount. These
other investments, however, are either not perfectly correlated with the shares or debt and hence
17represent higher risk, or they are only available in particular situations, or they are available only
in small quantities or at higher cost, or all of the above. These shortcomings severely limit the
facility, frequency, and extent to which these other investments could enable over-hedging.
By contrast, derivatives are designed to be perfectly (negatively) correlated with the payo⁄s of
shares or debt. Many derivatives markets, such as those for equity options, are highly liquid at
all times. Even those that are not, such as single-name CDS, exhibit liquidity spikes around key
events when over-hedging is most pro￿table, such as changes in credit outlook for CDS (Chen et
al. 2011). In general, the rapid growth of derivatives markets over the last decade or two means
that derivatives are in principle available in high volumes at low prices (spreads). It is not unusual
that the face amount of derivatives written on the shares or debt of an individual company exceeds
the amount of shares or debt issued by that company (Stulz 2010).
4.2 Required control stakes
Even if derivatives are available, it might seem an implausible proposition to acquire and over-
hedge a voting majority (51%) of a corporation￿ s shares or publicly traded debt. Such quantities of
shares/debt and derivatives may not even be available on the market, and if they were, could hardly
be acquired in secret and without strongly a⁄ecting prices. For shares, acquiring such quantities
would also trigger disclosure and other obligations under corporate and securities laws and, in most
U.S. corporations, the ￿poison pill.￿ 6
Many relevant decisions, however, can be a⁄ected by much smaller percentages of shares or
debt. One possibility is that an over-hedged shareholder or creditor joins forces with some other
constituency pursuing interests other than maximizing share or debt value, such as a corporate
insider.
More importantly, some corporate decisions provide blocking power to relatively small minori-
ties. In particular, out-of-bankruptcy restructurings tend to set acceptance thresholds around 95%,
providing blocking rights to 5% or even less of the outstanding debt. Importantly, restructurings
6See in particular section 13(d) of the Exchange Act, which requires disclosure of equity ownership stakes above
5% and arguably of any hedges relating thereto (cf. discussion in the next section), and section 16 of the Exchange
Act, which forces 10% shareholders to disclose their hedges (sec. 16(a)) and disgorge short-swing trading pro￿ts (sec.
16(b)). Moreover, section 16(c) prohibits 10% shareholders from engaging in short sales, and rule 16c-4 explicitly
extends this to over-heding using puts, while they are a 10% shareholder, thus outlawing any strategy of acquiring a
voting stake ￿rst and over-hedging it later (but not the other way around).
18that do not bind all holders, such as a standard debt exchange, do not constitute a credit event under
the prevailing CDS documentation and hence do not trigger settlement of the CDS.7 Practitioners
suspect that over-hedging and negative voting are common in out-of-bankruptcy restructurings.8
In addition to restructurings, small stakes may be su¢ cient to a⁄ect freeze-out mergers. Majority-
of-the-minority conditions in freeze-outs can give blocking rights to as little as a few percent of the
corporation￿ s outstanding equity.9
4.3 Legal constraints
At least in the U.S., current law only provides incomplete protection against over-hedging and
negative voting. With respect to formal voting, U.S. law arguably provides some protection, but
enforcement may be hindered by a lack of disclosure. Outside of formal voting, negative voting and
over-hedging are arguably entirely unregulated.
Under §1126(e) of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, bankruptcy judges have the power to disallow
votes by a creditor ￿whose acceptance or rejection of [a reorganization] plan was not in good faith.￿
In a recent decision, the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York held, obiter,
that this provision would justify disquali￿cation of votes by over-hedged creditors.10 Bankruptcy
courts will generally not know, however, if creditors are over-hedged. Current bankruptcy rules do
not require disclosure of hedging transactions relating to debt claims ￿led in the bankruptcy.
For shares, the Delaware Supreme Court recently recognized ￿[a] Delaware public policy of
guarding against the decoupling of economic ownership from voting power.￿ 11 There is thus reason
to believe that Delaware courts would at least seriously consider a remedy against voting by over-
hedged shareholders. Section 13(d)(1)(E) of the Exchange Act arguably requires that owners of 5%
or more of a corporation￿ s stock disclose hedging transactions, but in practice market participants
have not done so e⁄ectively. To address the enforcement problem, commentators have advocated
stricter disclosure obligations. For example, Hu and Black (2006, 885) argue that voting by over-
7Cf. Art. 4.7(a) of the 2003 ISDA Credit Derivative De￿nitions, as amended by the "Small Bang Protocol,"
available at http://www.isda.org/publications/pdf/July-2009-Supplement.pdf.
8Author￿ s conversation with the head of the restructuring practice of a major New York law ￿rm.
9Such majority-of-the-minority conditions have been imposed by Delaware courts as a condition for obtaining
favorable review of the consideration paid to the minority, see In re Cox Communications Inc. Shareholders Litigation
879 A.2d 604 (2005); In re CNX Gas Corp. Shareholders Litigation, 4 A.3d 397 (Del. Ch. 2010).
10In re DBSD North America, Inc., 421 B.R. 133, 143 n. 44 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009).
11Crown Emak Partners, LLC v. Kurz, 992 A.2d 377, 387 n. 17 (Del. 2010).
19hedged shareholders or creditors above a threshold of 0.5% of a company￿ s shares or debt should
be reported.
Neither of these rules or proposals, however, deals with the exercise of control rights other
than formal voting rights. In particular, no rule forces an over-hedged creditor to participate in
a debt exchange, even if the over-hedging were publicly known. In freeze-out tender o⁄ers, the
Delaware Chancery Court has excluded votes by hedged shareholders for purposes of a majority-
of-the-minority condition.12 These decisions are based on ￿duciary duties of the board and parent
shareholders, however, and it is not clear that they would extend to situations in which the hedged
shareholder stands in opposition to the board and the parent. In particular, the Court has a¢ rmed
that even controlling shareholders are under no obligation to sell their shares, even if doing so might
be bene￿cial to other shareholders or the corporation.13
5 Conclusion
This paper has shown theoretically that derivatives can create opportunities for purely value-
reducing activity (over-hedging and negative voting) if derivative traders can conceal their overall
positions from their counterparties. It has also argued that the institutional and legal conditions
in the US are such that the threat of such activity seems real at least in out-of-bankruptcy restruc-
turings and freezeout mergers.
This assessment of the role of derivatives is considerably less benign than that of other papers
that have assumed no asymmetric information in the relationship between derivative counterparties,
in particular Bolton and Oehmke (2011) and Campello and Matta (2012). Determining which
assumption better describes the derivative market, or rather which parts of that market correspond
to which assumption, seems an important area for future research. In as much as regulatory
reforms push derivative trading into anonymous exchanges and hence closer to the assumptions of
the present paper, it would be worth considering ￿ anking measures to guard against the problems
discussed here.
12See In re CNX Gas Corp. Shareholders Litigation, 4 A.3d 397, at 418 (Del. Ch. 2010); In re Pure Resources,
Inc., Shareholders Litigation, 808 A.2d 421, at 426 and 446 (Del. Ch. 2002).
13Cf. In re Digex, Inc. Shareholders Litigation, 789 A.2d 1176, 1189-91 (Del. Ch. 2002) (noting that a controlling
shareholder is free to block the sale of the controlled corporation to another bidder by not selling).
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22Appendix ￿Proof of Lemma 1
(1) ￿ is fully pinned down by rational expectations at net market demand pairs (^ x; ^ y) that fully
reveal the hedge fund￿ s voting power and incentives. There are two such cases. First, as there is no
noise in the securities market, low security demand ^ x = x + ~ x ￿ x + ~ x fully reveals that the hedge
fund does not have the voting power to implement the "wrong" decision (x < x), and hence ￿ = 0.
Second, as the amount of noise in the derivatives market is limited, observed net demand ^ y puts
bounds on the possible hedge fund trades and may reveal that the hedge fund strictly prefers the
"wrong" or the "right" decision. In particular, if derivatives demand is su¢ ciently low relative to
securities demand (^ y < y+^ x￿~ x), it is clear that even with low noise trader demand the hedge fund
could not possibly have acquired more derivatives than securities (y = ^ y￿~ y ￿ ^ y￿y < ^ x￿~ x = x). In
this case, the hedge fund clearly strictly prefers the "right" decision, which will hence be adopted,
so ￿ = 0. A symmetric argument shows that ￿ = F (^ x ￿ ~ x) if derivatives demand is su¢ ciently
high (^ y > ￿ y + ^ x ￿ ~ x) to reveal that the hedge fund will use all its power (F (^ x ￿ ~ x)) to implement
the "wrong" decision.
(2) At other market demand pairs (^ x; ^ y), ￿ can w.l.o.g. be set to equate expected hedge fund
pro￿ts for the two trades that could have generated this demand, namely
￿
^ x ￿ ~ x; ^ y ￿ y
￿
(such that
x ￿ y ￿a "short trade") and (^ x ￿ ~ x; ^ y ￿ ￿ y) (such that x ￿ y ￿a "long trade"), truncated at the
outer bounds of rationally possible beliefs, namely 0 and F (^ x ￿ ~ x).
(a) For market demand pairs that are actually observed in a mixed equilibrium, this is
in fact the only ￿ consistent with equilibrium because in order to mix, the hedge fund must be
indi⁄erent between the underlying long and short trades. For o⁄ equilibrium demand pairs, setting
market makers￿subjective o⁄-equilibrium beliefs at this level achieves maximum "deterrence" of
deviations from equilibrium (because at other values, either the long or short deviation would be
more pro￿table). Finally, no pure strategy equilibrium can ever generate such market demand pairs
(^ x; ^ y) because the only possible pure strategey equilibrium is (0;0), for which ^ x fully reveals that
x = 0 ￿ x; at other pure strategies, the hedge fund would incur trading cost without being able to
make a trading pro￿t because its voting power and incentives are fully known and hence the hedge
fund pays for the derivatives and securities exactly what it expects to get out.
(b) Truncation is immaterial because where truncation occurs, both long and short pro￿ts
23are negative with or without truncation, such that the hedge fund would not place the corresponding
trades in either case. Consider ￿rst truncation at ￿ = 0. For the long trade (x ￿ y), expected
pro￿ts (￿￿[(^ x ￿ ~ x) ￿ (^ y ￿ ￿ y)] ￿ C (^ x ￿ ~ x; ^ y ￿ ￿ y)) are negative at ￿ ￿ 0 (recall that the only cases
considered here have x > x ￿ 0, such that C (x;y) > 0).14 Thus if equality of pro￿ts for long
and short trades occurs at ￿ ￿ 0, both pro￿ts are negative at that ￿. But then pro￿ts for the
short trade ((1 ￿ ￿)[F (^ x ￿ ~ x) ￿ ￿]
￿￿
^ y ￿ y
￿
￿ (^ x ￿ ~ x)
￿
￿C
￿
^ x ￿ ~ x; ^ y ￿ y
￿
) must also be negative at
￿ = 0 because short pro￿ts are decreasing in ￿. The argument for upper truncation at F (^ x ￿ ~ x) is
symmetric.
(c) ￿￿ equates pro￿ts for the long and short trades, i.e., ￿￿ solves ￿￿[(^ x ￿ ~ x) ￿ (^ y ￿ ￿ y)] ￿
C (^ x ￿ ~ x; ^ y ￿ ￿ y) = (1 ￿ ￿)[F (^ x ￿ ~ x) ￿ ￿]
￿￿
^ y ￿ y
￿
￿ (^ x ￿ ~ x)
￿
￿ C
￿
^ x ￿ ~ x; ^ y ￿ y
￿
.
14The economic reason is that long trading pro￿ts derive from misleading the market into thinking that the "wrong"
decision may be taken (￿ > 0), the more the better.
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